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BOOK REVIEWS
THROUGH A GLASS, DARKLY
Hell to Pay: Operation DOWNFALL and the Invasion of Japan, 1945–1947, by D� M� Giangreco� Annapo-
lis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2017� 584 pages� $35�
Since August 1945, historians have 
debated President Harry S� Truman’s 
controversial decision to use the atom 
bomb—a catastrophic new military 
technology—to force Japan’s Em-
peror Hirohito to surrender and avoid 
a costly Allied invasion of the Japan 
home islands� In his well-researched 
Hell to Pay (first published in 2009, 
but newly updated and expanded 
in October 2017), D� M� Giangreco 
weighs in on the traditional side of the 
debate, arguing that Truman based his 
decision on reasonable casualty estima-
tions and sound military planning�
Two schools of thought have framed 
the debate� Traditionalists maintain that 
Truman’s claims were justified, while 
revisionists argue that use of atomic 
force was unnecessary because Japan’s 
sea, land, and air forces were largely 
destroyed and Soviet entry into the war 
against Japan tipped the scales toward 
inevitable defeat� Giangreco, however, 
disagrees with revisionist historians 
such as Bernard Bernstein who contend 
that Truman exaggerated casualty 
projections� Giangreco provides readers 
with a rich stream of lesser-known 
dates, facts, and figures, including with 
regard to troop movements, Selective 
Service needs, and medical supplies� 
Both the United States and Japan 
scrambled to organize land, sea, and air 
resources, drawing inexorably toward 
a hellish, last-ditch fight to the finish�
Hell to Pay’s seventeen chapters flow 
chronologically from 1944 through 
the end of the war in 1945, then 
continue with events up to 1947� In this 
revised edition, Giangreco adds two 
new chapters (chapter 11, “To Break 
Japan’s Spine,” and chapter 17, “The 
Hokkaido Myth”) and an appendix 
that provide facts pertinent to the 
Soviet entry into the war� In addition 
to these new chapters, several others 
stand out as especially noteworthy�
In chapter 2, “Spinning the Casualty 
Numbers,” Giangreco gives details on 
how U�S� military leaders calculated 
total casualty numbers and how, when, 
and why they chose to publish them� 
The U�S� government wanted public 
support for Selective Service, but also 
did not want to reveal its deployment 
plans to the enemy� Although many 
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strategists argued at the time that the 
number of replacements needed that 
U�S� leaders published was inflated, the 
author argues that strategists actually 
intentionally underinflated the numbers, 
using mostly conservative estimates� U�S� 
troops, for example, were familiar with 
repeated announcements that at least 
five hundred thousand replacements 
were needed to continue the war in 
Japan, whereas on March 9, 1945, Yank 
magazine published figures for U�S� 
losses from the beginning of World War 
II through February 7, 1945, of “782,180, 
including 693,342 for the Army alone” 
(p� 20)� In addition to exploring the vari-
ous methods of estimation, Giangreco 
gives evidence that Truman based his 
decision to avoid invasion on conserva-
tive, not inflated, casualty estimates�
In his fifth chapter, “Not the Recipe for 
Victory,” Giangreco documents U�S� and 
Japanese reallocations of troops among 
various areas of operation� Despite Al-
lied attempts to deceive the enemy with 
misleading communications campaigns, 
Japanese military leaders correctly 
anticipated the time and location for 
the planned initial Allied invasion of 
Japan’s home islands: October 1945 
in Kyushu, southern Japan� Accord-
ingly, the Japanese transferred thirteen 
divisions to Kyushu before the end of 
the war in August, whereas General 
Douglas MacArthur and U�S� planners 
expected only six to ten Japanese 
divisions� MacArthur anticipated 
outnumbering Japanese troops by a 
comfortable margin, but the thirteen 
divisions transferred made the probable 
ratio closer to 1 : 1� Giangreco empha-
sizes that, since “planned superiority” 
was no longer likely, Truman’s assertion 
that five hundred thousand lives would 
be lost probably was too conservative�
One of the most significant chapters in 
the book is chapter 6, “The Decision,” 
referring to Truman’s decision to drop 
the bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki� 
Giangreco traces factors from the sum-
mer of 1944 to August 1945 that affected 
the decision, including the casualty 
surge from the earlier ratio of more than 
4�5 Japanese casualties to every U�S� ca-
sualty to a more even ratio of 2 : 1 or even 
1�2 : 1 in recent campaigns, such as Iwo 
Jima� This surge was one of Truman’s 
considerations when he requested that 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) provide 
a projection of casualties that would 
result from an invasion of Kyushu�
The aforementioned new chapters 11 
and 17 contribute facts and research 
regarding Soviet entry and participa-
tion� Giangreco provides evidence 
that MacArthur and other military 
advisers supported Soviet entry into 
the war against Japan soon after Pearl 
Harbor� Accordingly, the author reasons 
that Truman did not drop the bombs 
to minimize Soviet participation; 
contrary to such a narrative, U�S�-Soviet 
cooperation in defeating Japan was an 
extension of Lend-Lease arrangements 
and planning� Although Giangreco 
argues that it always had been the intent 
of the JCS to incorporate the Soviets 
into U�S� war-termination plans in the 
Pacific, his research aligns in at least 
one instance with revisionists who 
argue that Truman wanted to minimize 
Soviet participation as much as possible: 
while MacArthur always argued for 
Soviet entry as the best plan, other JCS 
advisers, such as Admiral Ernest J� King, 
told Truman that the United States 
could defeat Japan without Stalin’s help�
Contemplation of the locations, par-
ticipants, and numbers involved in this 
story can be daunting, but a dedicated 
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reader gains a nuanced mental picture 
of the moving parts on both sides of 
the conflict� Scholars and researchers 
who desire in-depth information will 
benefit from Giangreco’s research, 
and the appendices and bibliography 
include numerous primary sources that 
have received little or no attention in 
past traditionalist-versus-revisionist 
debates� This work is a must-read for 
those interested in U�S� and Japanese 
military and political historiography and 
strategy in the final year of World War 
II and the critical factors contributing 
to war termination in the Pacific�
GINA GRANADOS PALMER
Progressives in Navy Blue: Maritime Strategy, 
American Empire, and the Transformation of 
U.S. Naval Identity, 1873–1898, by Scott Mobley� 
Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2018� 432 
pages� $34�95�
Judging Scott Mobley’s Progressives in 
Navy Blue by its cover, it might seem 
a bit esoteric� The parallels with the 
modern U�S� Navy, however, quickly 
become apparent in this well-written 
and -researched history of the transition 
of our Navy from sail to steam and from 
constabulary force to national fleet� This 
is Mobley’s first book, but in a thirty-
year career as a nuclear-trained surface 
warfare officer, including command of 
two ships, he lived the same “warrior-
engineer” dichotomy that was central to 
the late-nineteenth-century American 
naval culture around which this book 
revolves� The U�S� Navy between the 
Civil and Spanish-American Wars 
engenders limited historical discourse 
owing to the lack of naval combat, but 
Mobley asserts that the progressive 
currents that the naval officer corps 
debated during this period marked a 
pivotal shift in ideas on naval profes-
sionalism and strategic thinking�
The Gilded Age Navy, in relation to 
its time, was not an anachronistic 
organization wedded to outdated ideas, 
as it often is portrayed� Indeed, in many 
ways, the Navy of the 1870s and 1880s 
preceded the national Progressive 
movement� Even as the Navy addressed 
the massive challenges involved in 
incorporating emerging technology 
into an organization steeped in tradi-
tion, the service simultaneously had 
to deal with the emergence of national 
strategic thought� The idea that America 
should maintain a navy for war during 
peacetime ran counter to a century 
of tradition� Mobley asserts that this 
change in strategic focus drove the 
cultural shift in the Navy officer corps� 
In this he challenges previous scholars 
“who attribute the Navy’s revival to 
a mix of commercial expansionism, 
hegemonic aspirations, and imperial am-
bition” (p� 12)� Progressives in Navy Blue 
adds to the scholarship by considering 
the “influence of strategic ideas, beliefs, 
values, and practices upon the Navy’s 
professional culture and identity” (p� 14)�
With the marked exception of the Civil 
War, within the service’s first century 
“decades of overseas service, policing, 
and promoting America’s maritime 
empire fundamentally shaped the U�S� 
Navy as a constabulary force led by 
mariner-warriors” (p� 37)� The post–
Civil War American navy emphasized 
single-ship operations, with limited to 
no opportunity for multiship training� 
Naval officers and civilian leaders 
saw no need to dedicate resources to 
homeland defense, believing that the 
frigate-and-coastal-fort system in place 
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